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ABSTRACT 
 
Search words: Sympathy, empathy, human nature, moral, Adam Smith, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, impartial spectator, Sentimentalism 
 
The report at your current disposal is a thorough inquiry into the concept of 
sympathy as it is unfolded in the moral philosophy of Adam Smith (1723 –
1790) in his major philosophical work, ‘The Theory of Moral Sentiments’, and it 
seeks to give a well founded answer to how this concept explains human 
moral nature. As the concept of sympathy is clarified during the report, it 
shows that Smith indeed uses sympathy as the most fundamental principle in 
explaining human moral nature as opposed to for instance the notion of self-
love. Several problems relate to this simple assertion by Smith, those being 
for instance methodological; the way Smith arranges his arguments in mixing 
up descriptive and prescriptive statements, meta-theoretical; to the fact that 
his theory in the end seems rather vague al things considered, and lastly; in 
regard to the virtue-ethical basis, the theory is very much contingent on his 
own time.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In this day in age Adam Smith is commonly known as the economist who 
made ground for the market orientated liberalism and a founder of the 
national economics. We, however, have a different perspective on Smith. As 
well as a renowned economist, he was a key figure in the field of moral 
philosophy of his time. His first major work, ‘The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments’ (TMS), which was first published in 1759, made him known and 
esteemed throughout England and abroad (TMS, p. 25, editorial 
introduction), and it is from this philosophical work by Smith, this report 
takes its point of departure. 
Smith gives a description of our moral behaviour as something that goes 
beyond the individual. Smith’s concept of sympathy has a significant role in 
explaining this: It is through sympathy that people relate to the emotions of 
someone else and in this regard his notion of sympathy seems very similar to 
the contemporary notion of empathy. The claim is that human sentiments are 
not ultimately based on self-love. Instead Smith argues that there evidently 
exists some principles in the nature of human beings, that render them happy 
through the pleasure of sympathising with others. This is stated in the very 
first sentence of the TMS. 
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it” (TMS, I.I.I.I). 
The TMS informs greatly about what constitutes the human moral nature, as 
this quote above is a good example of, as well as with numerous 
observations, references to ancient, as well as contemporary works of 
literature, and persuasive argumentation primarily founded in introspection. 
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His method in itself has been and continues to be an object of thorough 
investigation.1 
The age in which Adam Smith was alive is today known as the 
Enlightenment, could roughly be characterised by its emphasis on rationality, 
progress and its view on nature. It gave birth to some, for the time being 
revolutionary thoughts, where the ideal was to eliminate prejudices, 
delusional and superstitious explanations and through the light of reason, see 
the natural order. The physical law of Newton is an example of this, and his 
notion of cause and effect had a tremendous influence in both science and 
philosophy of the time (Tankens Magt, p. 1067-1071). Smith gathers different 
characteristics from the enlightenment ideals, but is inspired by points from 
the old stoics2 as well. This makes him an interesting transitional figure 
because he, in some measure, can be said to operate with the mechanistic 
viewpoint expressed by Newton, but based on a foundation of emotion 
instead of physical observations. 
In the field of moral philosophy there exist different approaches. 
Sentimentalism is that tradition which sprung in 18th century Britain 
(Blackburn, 2006) of which Adam Smith as well as his notable 
contemporaries Francis Hutcheson and David Hume (1711- 1776), usually 
are categorised in3. Common is that they try to account for moral behaviour 
and motivation on some emotional ground. Albeit, not rejecting entirely, the 
possibility to have rational processes intertwined with motivational 
sentiments. Smith presents some highly interesting perspectives to the 
problem of the relationship between emotionalism and rationalism within 
moral philosophy. Whereas in his time David Hume and Immanuel Kant 
                                                
1 for instance by Dr. Jack Weinstein and Charles L. Griswold 
2 referring to the ancient Greek school which “taught that virtue, the highest good, is based on knowledge, and 
that the wise live in harmony” (Oxford, 2007) 
3 www.rep.routledge.com.molly.ruc.dk/article/L003?ssid=368133438&n=3 
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where notable as respectably stressing the emotional and rational element of 
morality4, Smith does not dichotomise these as strongly but tries to account 
for the human experience as a whole, being well in harmony with 
contemporary notions on the subject (Weinstein 2001: 1065).  
1.1 Notions of Sympathy and Morality 
It could be argued that Smith's ambition with the TMS is to provide a 
foundation for explaining human moral on the basis of human sentiments. In 
a section entitled ‘Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral 
Sentiments’ (TMS, VI.I.I.I.2), Smith stresses two points about what a moral 
philosophy is to occupy itself with: It is to examine the question of wherein 
virtue exists, and what makes people judge each others actions and 
sentiments as being good or bad. This is of course somewhat of a 
simplification of his thoughts, but it works well however, to illustrate the 
extensive goal he has for the TMS. 
Smith emphasises the concept of sympathy in his own attempt to answer the 
above questions, and in his time it appears as something which is peculiar to 
him alone. This may have been a break with Thomas Hobbes’ 5 and Bernard 
Mandeville’s6 fundamental view that self-love is the basis of moral, but in 
return, it gives rise to some critical questions about how Smith’s concept of 
sympathy is to be understood and in general how it is able to explain what he 
applies it to. Just as importantly, it gives ground for a thorough inquiry into 
how Smith envisages society and human moral nature in general (in relation 
to this concept). Below we have presented a problem formulation that should 
                                                
4 www.iep.utm.edu/e/ethics.htm  
5 English philosopher, scientist, and historian, best known for his political philosophy,  
(search.eb.com.molly.ruc.dk/search?query=mandeville&x=0&y=0) 
6 Dutch prose writer and philosopher who won European fame with The Fable of the Bees, 
(search.eb.com.molly.ruc.dk/eb/article-9050488) 
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make us capable of shedding some light on the issues we have just put 
forward. 
1.2 Problem formulation 
How does the concept of sympathy explain human moral nature in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments? 
1.2.1 Reflections on the problem formulation 
This problem formulation entails several presumptions which ultimately 
determine the course of the project. There are two such presumptions which 
we find necessary to elaborate on. We presume that the concept of sympathy 
indeed explains human moral nature in the TMS. This shows our viewpoint, 
but is not necessarily true though. It is possible to have a different viewpoint, 
stating that human moral nature has little to do with sympathy or just that the 
concept of sympathy instead could be substituted by some term which is 
more fundamental.  
In order to answer our problem formulation and the presumptions implied in 
it, we have specified three areas of inquiry which should help us clarify some 
of the basic notions in the theory. Firstly we will a) account for how to 
understand the concept of sympathy, and b) account for the connection 
sympathy has to morality, and c) how we understand the sympathy of other 
people and how we, in this way, become moral beings informed by the 
concept of the impartial spectator. 
1.3 Literature and methodological considerations 
In this project we initially reconstruct the basic theory as presented in the 
first parts of the TMS. We do this in the attempt to get a good basis for 
discussing relevant issues to our problem formulation. In order to do so in 
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the best way possible, we chose to reflect and analyse Smith’s concepts; 
especially on sympathy but also on propriety/impropriety, 
approbation/disapprobation, merit/demerit and the impartial spectator. The 
report moreover is structured from these considerations and has thus the 
structure of a logical succession, meaning that the later chapters rely on what 
has been said in the former ones. More specifically, in chapter two we clarify 
the concept of sympathy as it is presented in the TMS. Thereafter, we go into 
what sympathy amounts to in a more societal aspect and what this says about 
morality. Lastly, the concept of the Impartial Spectator and its significance 
for the individual moral socialisation is addressed.    
The endeavor is to cover as many relevant aspects, and to pose questions 
related to what we find intriguing in this theory in relation to our problem 
definition. Our aim is to shed light on: What Smith provides us with in this 
respect, what of relevance might be partly or wholly omitted in the theory 
and to see how curious statements and arguments make way for inquiries. By 
bringing our own interpretation to it and moreover our own opinions, it is 
very much an answer informed by our own conception of the theory. Hence 
our approach, which is hermeneutical, relies very much on our own reasoning 
and analytical ability and to some degree on conferring it with relevant 
theory. 
1.3.1 Delimitation 
In terms of delimitation we have chosen to focus only on the first three parts 
of the TMS. We do this because this suffices in answering our problem 
formulation. It is in these parts Smith conveys the core elements of the 
theoretical framework as we see it. However as the remaining chapters do 
touch upon interesting issues which connect highly to our elements of focus, 
without being central to them, and additionally as we refrain from elaborating 
on some certain issues in the first three chapters, we will now account for 
which these are and why we choose not to treat them, or only treat them in a 
Module 1 - Philosophy, 2008 
Page 8 of 66 
minute degree. There are many small issues as well which we delimitate, 
however we here account only for the chief ones. 
Virtue 
Virtue is one of these. Although it is one of the main themes in the TMS, and 
although we touch upon it in several instances, we find that it is not of the 
utmost importance to have any comprehensive treatment of in order to 
answer our problem formulation. Additionally it would demand too many 
resources both in terms of time and space. But also as we want to know how 
sympathy explains human moral nature, we only need to know how virtue 
connects with this explanation. And although human moral nature according 
to Smith might be analysed in relation to his view on virtue, this is not what 
we are after. In other words we want to see what sympathy explains, and not 
what Smith’s view of virtue explains. Hence it is enough to give a general 
definition of it here which is the one we denote virtue by throughout the 
project. Virtue is something which in relation to morality, Smith believes, 
should be everyone’s aim at acquiring:  
“Virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which 
rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary. The amiable virtues consist in 
that degree of sensibility which surprises by its exquisite and unexpected 
delicacy and tenderness. The awful and respectable, in that degree of self-
command which astonishes by its amazing superiority over the most 
ungovernable passions of human nature” (TMS, p. 25) 
Justice 
Another major issue is justice. Although it is mentioned and dealt with a lot 
in the TMS, and while it connects to both sympathy and human moral 
nature, we find that having any great focus on justice would be to wander too 
far away from our problem at hand. Although we see that many of the topics 
we deal with lead to a discussion of justice, it is limited to briefly touched 
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upon in chapter three and four of our report. Although interesting, it would 
not purport to say much about sympathy’s explanation of moral human 
nature in more than an indirect manner.  
Religion 
Religion, God and other issues relating to a deity, are found in many places in 
the TMS. Furthermore, Smith states that in later times, philosophy and 
reason have taken on the role of religion in informing the rules of morality 
(TMS, p. 164). And although it could be of some interest to dwell on it in 
relation to morality and human nature, it would lead to a discussion away 
from the one we are seeking, because we do not as such seek to know what 
grounds human moral nature as such, but what it is explained as by 
sympathy.   
1.3.2 Choice of literature 
Our primary literature consists of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (the 
TMS) as it is printed in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of 
Adam Smith (The Liberty Fund). Consequently all references to Adam Smith 
are from this version of the TMS, if nothing else is noted. Our secondary 
literature consists primarily of English compilation works, but there is also 
some Danish literature among. These are mainly encyclopaedias or the like.  
In our project we have come across different works by international 
researchers on Adam Smith.  
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2 THE CONCEPT OF SYMPATHY  
In order to account for our problem formulation which addresses how the 
concept of sympathy explains human moral nature, it would support the later 
analysis and discussions to clarify it. We do this by first introducing the 
philological background, then clarifying on concepts which are internally 
constituent to what the concept of sympathy conveys.  
Ensuing this, we go into the terms of approbation/disapprobation, propriety 
and impropriety and lastly covering the place of imagination. 
2.1 Its place in history  
To try to give a somewhat full account of the concept of Sympathy we will 
first make a short summation of some of its philological marks through 
history.  
The term Sympathy has its roots in latin as Sympathia and has been recorded 
from the 15th century.
7
 In that century it has among others, found its use to 
mean agreement/concord - Shakespeare for instance writes "O what a simpathy of 
woe is this!" (cf. title page) to illustrate a harmony of common despair among a 
flok of involved.  
The concept of sympathy has also been applied in fields of science before 
Smith used it. Phrases such as the “sympathetic nervous system” was applied by 
schools of Graeco-Roman physiology and medicine and used to account for 
a way in which damage or pain in one part of the body, can have an effect on 
another part of the body (Haakonssen, 2006, p161). A use which exists still in 
physiology today: "a reciprocal influence exercised by different parts of the body on one 
                                                
7 "sympathy n." Oxford English Dictionary, second edition 1989 <http://tinyurl.com/6le8wu>  
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another."
8
 
Smith’s contemporary, David Hume, also employed the concept of 
Sympathy. For Hume it has to be seen as a pivotal part of his philosophical 
framework of ideas and impressions. Here the concept of sympathy is a 
technical term denoting the relation between spectator and agent – agent 
being the person principally concerned. The process of sympathy for Hume 
is when the spectator observes in the agent, qualities or behaviour which he 
takes to signify a given passion and in doing so, forms an idea of that feeling.  
“This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a 
degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and 
produce an equal emotion, as any original affection.”(Haakonssen, 2006, p. 
162)  
That is, for Hume there is an equality between the sentiments of the two 
persons. 
Where Smith differs from Hume, as we examine later on, is that for Hume 
the concept of sympathy  
“is essentially a principle of communication by which the spectator comes to 
have a passion that he believes the agent to have and he comes to have it 
because of the belief.”(Haakonssen, 2006, p163) 
Smith contrarily holds that the concept of sympathy enables the spectator to 
also experience emotion which the agent might not have (ibid). 
Sympathy, in Smith terms, can be used “to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion 
whatever”(TMS, I.I.I.5). Thereby he allures to a purely functional concept, void 
of any passion in itself. It is a mechanism by which we can come to 
experience the feelings which we believe others to have, based on what we 
                                                
8 "sympathy n." Concise Medical Dictionary. Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford 
University Press. Roskilde Universitetsbibliotek. 14 December 2008 
<www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t60.e9805>  
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observe is the object of their original emotions. In this sense it closely 
corresponds to what we in present terminology would denote as empathy in 
that we understand some ability to feel 'from the inside' what other people 
feel.  
2.1.1 The relation between concepts 
In modern language the term, Sympathy, is usually used to express a feeling 
of pity or sorrow for someone else. It is thereby already woven with a special 
sort of emotionally charged meaning and significance. This use can also be 
seen earlier in history. Adam Smith himself for instance writes such:  
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling 
with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, 
originally the same, may now, [...] (TMS, I.I.I.5, own underlining)  
As Smith points out here, the concept of Sympathy might have meant 
"originally the same" as our expressions of pity and compassion, but the way 
he himself will use it is broader than that.  
Firstly, if we should try to outline in a more formal manner, the ways in 
which Sympathy should be understood, then we should consult our 
encyclopedia entries. The following two points are the ways Oxford 
Dictionary of Philosophy (Blackburn, 2006) and the 9th ed. of Little Oxford 
English Dictionary advices one to think of Sympathy:  
"The ability to share in another person’s feelings and concerns with the accompanying 
delight in their joys and grief at their sorrows." (Blackburn, 2006)  
"1. The feeling of being sorry for someone. 2. Support for or approval of something. 3. 
Understanding between people." (Oxford, 2007)  
Compared to same dictionaries' definition of Empathy  
“[...] the state of being emotionally and cognitively ‘in tune with’ another person, 
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particularly by feeling what their situation is like from the inside, or what it feels like for 
them. [...]” (Blackburn, 2006)  
“the ability to understand and share the feelings of someone else.” (Oxford, 2007)  
Now, the way that we should understand the concept of Sympathy, as related 
to these given definitions, is as a concept which most strongly concords with 
Blackburn's (Blackburn, 2006) definition of empathy. In Smith, the concept 
of Sympathy should be understood as a process of imagining oneself in the 
place of another, and thereby come to feel what she feels, or even, what she 
ought to feel based on whatever is the stimuli of emotions.  
When reading Smith it is important to also notice the delicacies of his use of 
language. By doing so we can come to get a greater understanding of the 
concept of Sympathy in total, and it might be easier for us to pinpoint its 
relation to human nature later on. First of, Smith uses several different terms 
of primary relevance to Sympathy. Terms like feeling, sentiment, emotion and 
passion are, although analogous, not equivalent. Emotion can for instance be 
seen (in TMS) as the more indistinct counterpart to the original passion of an 
agent in the sympathetic relationship between an agent and a spectator. The 
agent is the holder of the original passion and the spectator, can come to, by 
sympathy and imagination, to experience an analogous emotion.  
Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person 
principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of 
his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. (TMS, I:I:I:4)  
Sentiment, for Smith, seems to be used as a more neutral term, describing the 
general emotions of a person. It doesn’t hold the vivacity and violence of a 
passion, nor the closeness of an emotion. This is illustrated in a sentence 
such as: “according as there is more or less disproportion between his sentiments and mine, 
I must incur a greater or less degree of his disapprobation” (TMS, I.I.III.1). Sentiments 
is sort of the flat end-state of an internal process of refining original passions, 
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mixed with emotions, induced by imagination and coming together to form a 
sense of the overall (emotional) impression a person has towards an object. 
This is of course a bold statement, so lets go on in describing the framework 
of Sympathy.  
2.1.2 Framework of Sympathy 
When Smith talks of "objects of passions" (for instance, TMS I.II.I.3), by 'object' 
he does not imply that it is so narrow as only applying to physical thing 
things, e.g. an apple that inspires our passion of hunger. He uses it in a broad 
way which might be expressed with 'that which excites our passion'. Any 
'thing' can excite a passion in us. It could be an event exciting our passion of 
joy, an observation of the conduct of a person exciting a passion of gratitude 
or indeed just the imagination of a future state of happiness which excites our 
passion of hope.  
The mechanical/functional aspect of Sympathy is further strengthened by 
Smith’s use of it in adverbial variations. When he for instance writes: “When 
the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the 
sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper” 
(TMS, I.I.III.1) the expression “sympathetic emotions” denotes directly that it 
is the emotions which arise in the spectator from imagining himself to be in 
the situation of the agent. It is the same as what Smith also denotes as "entirely 
sympathise"(ibid).  
The notion of disagreeableness is another term to be aware of. There is a 
distinction between saying that we find the passions of the agent, compared 
to saying we find our sympathetic passions disagreeable themselves. If for 
instance, the agent feels grief, the spectator's experience of feelings, which “is 
not altogether unlike them” (TMS, I.I.I.2) gives the spectator and, as we shall see, 
the agent pleasure. However, because the passion in itself is disagreeable, the 
spectator will find it painful to sympathise with the agent, and only do this 
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reluctantly. Conversely, if it is the passions of the agent himself which we 
find disagreeable - if we feel he should express his passions differently in his 
situation - it causes us to have absolutely no sympathy with him. We find his 
passions worthy of our disapprobation.  
2.2 The specificities of Sympathy   
For Smith, sympathising should be seen as a three-fold process: 1) we 
imagine to be in the shoes of the agent 2) feelings (sympathetic passion) 
spring up in us from this imagining 3) any sentiment is a sentiment for action 
- the immediateness of our conceived feelings, prompts us for action. In the 
cases where our (as spectators) sympathetic passions correspond to what we 
observe of the agent (that is, where conditions 1) and 2) are fulfilled), we 
denote that we have full sympathy with the agent or that we 'entirely 
sympathise'. In the cases where there is disagreement of more or less extent 
between our sentiments, we denote as 'a lower degree of sympathetic 
connection' with the agent. And in the other extreme, in the cases where our 
sentiments are completely disparate from the agent, we speak of having 'no 
sympathy' with the agent. It should be properly noted that the sentiments of 
the spectator (after fulfilling 1) and 2)), need not end up with the same 
sentiments as that observed in the agent.  
“whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, 
nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with 
all the emotions of our own breast […] Man, say they [who defend that 
humans are ultimately only self-interested], conscious of his own weakness, 
and of the need which he has for the assistance of others, rejoices 
whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he is then 
assured of that assistance” (TMS, I.I.II.1)   
Here we see the first attempt of Smith trying to provide an explanation of the 
motivation of our Sympathetic relationship to others. By making the initial 
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remark of “whatever may be the cause of sympathy”, Smith cleverly evades placing 
pleasure as the cause. He evades placing himself in the Hobbesian view on 
human beings as self-interested ‘pleasure seekers’. Instead he tries to 
persuade us by descriptive style of writing, that this is a state of fact, that, 
really, “nothing pleases us more” than to observe this correspondence of feelings. 
Whether this thus, in fact, amount to some 'pleasure seeking' behaviour 
depends again on how Smith is to be interpreted. If we understand the 
statement "nothing pleases us more" as a post factum statement, it could be 
argued that humans act for sympathy in itself primarily, but that the pleasure 
is a positive side-effect of such action. In the following sentence, he makes a 
critique of the Hobbesian frame of explanation, but the example is of a 
construction which feels similar to a construction which Smith writes later on 
(in part II). It is the construction where, on the one hand we have the agent 
with his original sentiments as they are formed by the occurrence of an object 
(an event). Then we have the spectator, who by imagining himself being the 
agent under the agent's circumstances and finds agreement or disagreement 
between his sympathetic emotions and the passions of the agent. In the case 
of agreement, the spectator receives pleasure of being able to sympathise and 
the agent gains pleasure from observing that someone is able to sympathise 
to him. The question is to what extent the agent also feels gratitude for the 
spectator’s ability to sympathise with him. For if so, in the words of Smith: 
"The sentiment which most immediately and directly prompts us to reward, is gratitude" 
(TMS, II.I.I.2), it could then be argued that the reason for the spectator to 
sympathise, is for the agent to remunerate and in that sense the motivation of 
the spectator might be interpreted as self-interest. Ultimately it is the age old 
question of the egg and the hen - what comes first? Self-interest or other-
interest? "it is always disagreeable to feel that we cannot sympathize with him, [...] it 
hurts us to find that we cannot share his uneasiness." (TMS, I.I.II.6) As the spectator 
found that being able to sympathise with the passions of an agent brought 
pleasure for both him and the agent, so conversely, that is, the inability to 
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sympathise - the disagreeableness of sympathising - cause displeasure for 
spectator and agent. Nevertheless, it is, according to Smith, always satisfying 
for all human beings to experience to have mutual feelings with others even if 
it is an unpleasant and disagreeable feeling. 
2.3 The expression of feelings  
Normally we would see that the process of expressing our feelings is a central 
part of our nature where we communicate with others. What the facets are 
that regulate our expression of feelings, Smith gives an insightful account on 
which we here will try to expose.  
Firstly it will be useful to have in mind, Smith's categorisation of passions. He 
distinguishes at least between five different passions: passions which have 
their origin in the body; passions that have their origin from a special habit of 
imagination; unsocial passions; social passions and selfish passions. Common 
for all passions expressed is that their "natural tone"(TMS, I.I.IV.7) must in 
some way always be tuned down before being expressed. In Smiths view, it is 
not only a necessity but a prescription by Nature, that we by flattening out 
the expression of our emotions can come to achieve our pre-embedded 
desire for concord between our own emotions with that of a spectator. Smith 
writes:  
"In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to 
assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she 
teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectators."(TMS, 
I.I.IV.8)  
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what is the cause that prompts this delimiting 
behaviour of the expression of our passions. Though Smith does not write it 
explicitly, it could be argued that it is an innate desire in humans to 
experience such a concord with the emotions of others that is the secret 
Human Moral Nature 
Page 19 of 66 
behind this. If we further conjecture that a concord of emotion is a 
prerequisite for other people to love us, we can, however, find direct 
statement of Smith when he writes: "the chief part of human happiness arises from 
the consciousness of being beloved" (TMS, I.II.V.1)  
Another two factors which might prevent this concord from being achieved, 
is in the cases where either the agent or the spectator have a peculiar 
relationship to the object of emotion; or when the agent displays a form of 
excess in his/hers expression of feelings (TMS, I.II.intro.I). In such cases 
Smith describes that the extent to which the agent should expect the 
spectator to sympathise with him "must lie, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity." 
(TMS, I.II.intro.1) This is especially the case with the unsocial passions such as 
"hatred and resentment"(TMS, I.II.III.1). In the cases where the agent 
expresses an 'excess' of emotions (the weakness or fury of his expression 
because of his "stupidity [or] insensibility" (TMS, I.II.intro.I), it again causes 
discord because the spectator is unable to enter into it.  
 
2.3.1 Categories of feelings 
Passions which have their origin in the body 
What is characteristic of the passion which have their origin in the body, is 
that they are such subjective/personal experiences that it cannot be expected 
that others should be able to enter into them (TMS, I.II.I.1). Hunger and the 
attraction between sexes is what Smith presents as examples. He further 
argues so strong as to say that these passions are of such that "as soon as they 
are gratified, the object that excited them ceases to be agreeable" (TMS, I.II.I.3) and that 
oftenly, "its presence often becomes offensive to him"(ibid). Now, if we take hunger as 
an example, if we experience violent hunger such that we should, when 
presented with the possibility of eating, stuff ourselves excessively. But does 
this really lead to an immediate aversion of food? 
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Passions which take their origin from a habit of imagination 
With regards to sympathy, what is characteristic of the passions which 
originate from a habit of imagination, is that they are little sympathised with 
though they might be fully acknowledged (TMS, I.II.II.1). An example of 
such, Smith writes, is love, for  
"though we may think his passion [of love] just as reasonable as any of the 
kind, yet we never think ourselves bound to conceive a passion of the same 
kind, and for the same person for whom he has conceived it. The passion 
appears to every body, but the man who feels it, entirely disproportioned to 
the value of the object "(ibid).  
In Smith's view, love is formed over an extended course of time. Two 
persons who have fixated their minds on one another and continuously 
commit to becoming each other's object of happiness and gratification. And 
because love is more formed from such 'habitual behavior' than from any 
immediate excitement of an object, we are not obliged to, and not able 
sympathise much with the passion of the agent. An interesting question then 
appears to us. If this habituality of love would imply, contrarily, that we 
should be more able to sympathise with an agent who experiences 'love at 
first sight'? Smith does not appear to deal with such an event. 
Passions which are by nature unsocial 
Further complications arises when we observe expressions of unsocial 
passions. Smith puts "hatred and resentment, with all their different 
modifications."(TMS, I.II.III.1) as the basis which covers all these emotions. 
They are complicated because "our sympathy is divided between the person who feels 
them, and the person who is the object of them"(Ibid.). Smith regards the passions of 
hatred and resentment as "necessary parts of the character of human nature"(TMS, 
I.II.III.3) and sounds on the edge of being normative when he says: "A person 
becomes contemptible who tamely sits still, and submits to insults, without attempting either 
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to repel or to revenge them."(TMS, I.II.III.3) and allures us to a view of human 
nature when saying: "They [the mob] desire to see this insolence resented, and resented 
by the person who suffers from it."(Ibid.) Here, the lack of expressing an emotion, 
from the agents side, are found disagreeable Smith says, by the people around 
him. The strong affections around hatred and resentment comes down to, 
Smith argues, that hatred and resentment are disagreeable passions in 
themselves which renders them "natural object of our aversion." (TMS, 
I.II.III.4).  
Passions which are by nature social 
In the case of the social passions, we find that their common trait is that they 
are all agreeable to us in themselves. And where the unsocial passions were 
complicated because they prompted us in some way to take side when two 
people are resenting each other (and not being able to sympathise with any of 
them because we don't share the peculiarity of their relation to the other, we 
feel pain), the nature of the social passions instead enables us to sympathise 
with both person's gratitude and joy from a mutual friendship - a double 
sympathetic pleasure (TMS, I.II.IV.1). These passions contain generosity, 
humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem.  
A social passion (such as benevolence) is always agreeable because "We enter 
into the satisfaction both of the person who feels them, and of the person who is the object of 
them. [there is a double sympathy]" (TMS, I.II.IV.1) and Smith further points 
out that: "Those amiable passions, even when they are acknowledged to be excessive, are 
never regarded with aversion"(TMS, I.II.IV.3) One could argue that this is a 
somewhat naive view of acting from excessive social passions, because, some 
persons can be seen drawing the line when they've had enough, even of 
benevolence. From a Smithian terminology it might be argued that they've 
had enough in the sense that the benevolence which they observe in the 
agent, is so disproportioned to the object (themselves) that instead of being 
flattered, they feel that the agent ought to be ashamed of himself. But then 
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again, if Smith, by benevolence doesn't just mean ‘meaning to do good’ to 
others, but also being considerate of others, then Smith evades this point of 
our critique. 
Passions which are by nature selfish 
The selfish passions occupy sort of a middle ground between social and 
unsocial passions. Of these are placed grief and joy (TMS, I.II.V.1). They 
have the character that they can never be so disagreeable as that of strong 
resentment, nor can they be as agreeable to us as benevolence (ibid). That is 
of course because of the subject matter of these passions - when we act to 
fulfil our own desires only, it can never interest others strong enough for 
them to fully enter into it. Smith writes it thus:  
"Grief and joy, when conceived upon account of our own private good or 
bad fortune, [...] are never so disagreeable as excessive resentment, 
because no opposite sympathy can ever interest us against them: and [...] 
are never so agreeable as impartial humanity and just benevolence; 
because no double sympathy can ever interest us for them." (TMS, I.II.V.1)  
Grief and joy are special as well, because even they are the result of such 
subjective causes and their livelihood is so internal, they are still conceivable 
for spectators as well to experience to some degree. Smith ties this ability 
down to some special 'purity' of the passions:  
“If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the 
like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some 
good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe 
them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence 
upon us.” (TMS, I.I.I.8)  
Smith hereby dichotomises these two passions, (whether he is right in doing 
so we can't question yet) it is like they constitute the two extremes of the 
spectrum of emotional expressions and by their special purity they 
immediately inspire some like sentiment in the heart of every spectator. This 
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also exposes Smith's view of human nature - that pain and pleasure constitute 
the ultimate scope of human feelings. - grief being the purest form of pain, 
and joy being the purest form of pleasure. Concerning human nature, we find 
it useful to side note a tendency of sympathy which Smith remarks upon: "we 
are generally most disposed to sympathize with small joys and great sorrows." (TMS, 
I.II.V.1) 
Smith devotes some time to explain how we have a necessity of 
communicating our emotions, and to communicate some more than others.  
2.3.2 Communication of feelings  
The communication of feelings is mostly connected to the cases where we 
find disagreeableness between sympathetic emotions and the original 
passions of the agent. This aspect of Smith's view on human nature serves it 
part as displaying humans as having a need for consensus with each other, 
and dovetails nicely with the need for concord which we mentioned earlier in 
the chapter. 
Smith seems to contradict himself when giving an account of how and what 
passions it is in our nature to communicate. He writes:  
"It is to be observed accordingly, that we are still more anxious to 
communicate to our friends our disagreeable than our agreeable 
passions"(TMS, I.I.II.3)  
and  
"It was, it seems, the intention of Nature, that those rougher and more 
unamiable emotions, which drive men from one another, should be less 
easily and more rarely communicated."(TMS, I.II.III.6)  
But then again, it can be seen as the second is an elaboration of the first. Our 
disagreeable passions are a broad range of emotions while the unamiable 
ones are only a small set.  
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"[...] that we derive still more satisfaction from their sympathy with the former than from 
that with the latter, and that we are still more shocked by the want of it." (TMS, I.I.II.3) 
Smith presents a viewpoint that humans have a preference for 
communicating, to their friends (who are sympathetic to them), the ways in 
which they feel different from each other than the ways they overlap. A 
person who is happy while the spectator remains with a serious countenance 
wants to tell the spectator why he is happy, and in the case where the agent is 
feeling sad while the spectator's sympathetic feeling does not concur, the 
agent again wants to express the reason or wants to show the extent of his 
happiness to the spectator in order for the spectator to find propriety in his 
original passions. (This is a point which will repeat itself in the exposition of 
the Impartial Spectator, ch 4)  
2.3.3 Approbation of the feelings of the other  
As humans, we seek to sympathise and in so doing, approve of the sensations 
of others; but as previously mentioned, we must find the passion suitable to 
their object before it is possible for us to sympathise:  
"To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their 
objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with 
them" (TMS, I.I.III.1) 
Propriety of the observed feelings of an agent, is closely connected to how 
we sympathise with them. The sequence is to be thought of as such: The 
agent feels some passion based on some object of excitement; The spectator 
observes the feelings of the agent; The spectator imagines to be in the 
situation of the agent; The spectator gets an emotional response based on the 
imagination of being the agent in the agent's situation; If the spectator 
observes that the emotions concord, he finds the agents emotions agreeable, 
worthy of approbation (and consequent propriety of action) and we say that 
he entirely sympathises with the agent; If, conversely, the emotions discord 
he finds the agents emotions disagreeable, worthy of disapprobation (and 
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deems the agent's consequent action with impropriety) and we say that the 
spectator has no sympathy with the agent.  
The first few steps were proper sequential, but we see that when it comes to 
approbation and finding agreeableness and whether or not there is sympathy 
with the agent, all these seem to occur somewhat simultaneously (why some 
confusion of them might be expected).  
The strong connection with sympathy is further indicated by this quote:  
"if we consider all the different passions of human nature, we shall find that 
they are regarded as decent, or indecent, just in proportion as mankind are 
more or less disposed to sympathize with them." (TMS, I.II.intro.2)  
The decency/indecency of passions can suitably be understood as the 
approbation/disapprobation we form of them (TMS, I.I.III.6). And as we 
commented earlier on excessive expression of emotion, we can further add 
that these excesses are most likely to be given disapprobation.  
"To approve or disapprove [...] of the opinions of others is acknowledged, 
by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or 
disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to our 
approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of others." 
(TMS, I.I.III.2) 
In the sense that opinions can be regarded as more rationally processed 
judgmental explanations, what this quote illustrates is a clever little 
manoeuvre where Smith actually argues for sentiments as ultimately being the 
basis for all forms of approbation and disapprobation (even the opinions of 
others). Opinions might be refined through rational processes, but the 
grounds and the discussions basically just illustrate different manifestations of 
our approbation or disapprobation of the other through sympathetic relating. 
It seems Smith tries to defend a view that states: if we share feelings with our 
opponent towards an object (of a discussion), we agree with him. 
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“There are some passions of which the expressions excite no sort of 
sympathy, but before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, 
serve rather to disgust and provoke us against them.” (TMS, I.I.I.7) 
As Sympathy is the capacity to put oneself into the shoes of another person. 
When Smith here write “excite no sort of sympathy” what he means is not 
that the spectator is unable to put himself in the shoes of the agent and feel 
what he feels, but rather he is able to put himself in the shoes of the agent, 
but comes to have distinctly different emotions than the agent. Thereby we 
observe the disagreement of our emotions with that of the agent, and we 
come to feel his emotions deserve disapprobation. In a way we could say that 
it is rather misleading of Smith to write 'no sympathy', because sympathy is to 
be understood as a two-fold process, and the steps of that process are still 
fulfilled even though we come to have emotions which disagree with the 
emotions of the agent. (An alternative word might have been Antipathy - as 
wide in scope as Sympathy in that it also covers any feeling whatever and 
dependent on the same two steps, but specific in that it denotes the cases 
where emotions of spectator and agent contradict each other.) 
The importance of approbation for the agent, differs in correspondence to 
what is the object of sentiments to which he seeks approbation: "They can 
easily avoid being friends to our friends, but can hardly avoid being enemies to those with 
whom we are at variance." (TMS, I.I.II.5) Here we should understand Sympathy 
as that underlining which makes the spectator sympathise with an agent's 
gratitude/resentment towards a benevolent/malevolent third person, and 
thereby comes to adopt same sentimens towards this third. The statement 
draws upon an assertion which Smith has previously made, that it is in our 
nature that we are more anxious to communicate disagreeable passions than 
agreeable ones(TMS, I.I.II.3). By this sentence it is further signified that it is 
especially the disagreeable passions in which we are expressing a negative 
emotion, that we especially seek the sympathetic concord with a spectator. 
Smith explains it as: "The bitter and painful emotions of grief and resentment more 
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strongly require the healing consolation of sympathy." (TMS, I.I.II.5). This strange 
gravitation of Sympathy towards facilitating as a consolable, might account 
for the 'normal' use of the word to denote pity and compassion. 
The questions of How we give approbation of another's sentiments still need 
some clarification. Before reading Smith, it might appear to us that this topic 
of giving approbation, and especially to sentiments of others, must be a 
highly subjective evaluation. I can say that someone is slow because I have 
my own predefined idea of what constitutes good pace. But is that at all 
reasonable, isn't it in some sense similar to judging a deaf man for not hearing 
what we say to him? Smith, doesn't seem to go much into these affairs, but 
do give one general consideration: "Every faculty in one man is the measure by 
which he judges of the like faculty in another." (TMS, I.I.III.10) Here it seems like 
Smith gives a bit of a slack, the situations of agent and spectator might not be 
so universally comparable. With this addition it creates a possibility of 
scenarios where, for instance, an extremely abiding spectator, that judges an 
agent as acting with impropriety for being out with friends drinking on a 
workday (the faculty of reasonable behavior). Another example is if the 
spectator is of strong physical build, judging with impropriety on a regular 
guy who is not able do as much physical labour as the spectator (the faculty 
of strength). Another ensuing point of critique of this viewpoint, is that the 
'faculties' which we posses are such integrated part of our beings, that for 
them to serve as proper faculties of judgement, seems in some way 
unreasonable.  
In the first parts of the TMS, Smith usually focuses on matters concerning 
the individual, but every now and again he makes some digressions and talks 
of societal or collective aspects instead. One of the socially reinforcing 
aspects which he touches upon is the nature of admiration. He links it to 
approbation (which then ultimately comes down to sympathy) and only in 
those circumstances where it is also followed by the sentiments of "wonder 
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and surprise"(TMS, I.I.IV.3) The pitfall of this conjecture is that "wonder and 
surprise" is not universal. It is bound to subjective traditions. If I greet a 
person by bowing, it will surprise a dane (and approbation will be vexed as 
not everyone will find the gesture appropriate), but not a japanese person. To 
those danes who find the gesture in propriety, the added element of surprise, 
will by Smiths conjecture resolve in their admiration. 
One aspect of approbation (or more specifically, it is in the concept of 
sympathy) is the question of the amount of information we, as spectators, 
have available about the agent and how does the amount of information 
which we base our sympathy and judgment on, correlate to the judgment of 
approbation which we make of the agent's sentiments? The options are that 
a) we have full information, b) we have information of agent objects of 
sentiments from the agent's point of view, or c) information is limited to 
what the spectator in the specific situation knows about the circumstances. 
This last proposition would probably seem easiest to go along with for most 
of us, but would this in turn have to implicate that spectators sympathy may 
in some cases be grounded upon assessments of relevant objects different 
than those of the agent? And what does this have for consequences? But on 
the other hand, it would seem fairly naïve, if one assumes that the 
approbation of a given sentiment is based on the spectator having full 
information about the agent and his motives. We shall now turn our attention 
to the role imagination plays in sympathy. 
2.4 The place of imagination  
The basis of Smith's moral philosophy, as elaborated earlier is that humans 
are not only interested in the fortune of oneself, but also in that of others – 
and our pleasure from doing so derives only from the experience of seeing 
the pleasure of others. In this regard, remember our previous notion of 
Sympathy: describing our ability to imagine being in the shoes of another 
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person and to some sense feel what they feel. The keyword here is 
Imagination and has in it some inaccuracy, but as Smith writes:  
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form 
no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what 
we ourselves should feel in the same situation (TMS, I.I.I.2)   
This is common in all of mankind, and is one of the key foundations whereas 
the theory is built upon. The question is then in what way we conceive of 
ourselves in the same situation. Smith provides the answer to this as 
Imagination.  
”By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, 
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form 
some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though in 
weaker degree, is not altogether unlike them.” (TMS, I.I.I.2)   
This may at first hand seem a bit trivial, but as the notion is elaborated upon 
further into the book, it gives rise to some peculiarities.  
One such peculiarity, or at least a point worth noticing is the “become in 
some measure the same person with him”. This imagining oneself into the 
shoes of another person is what Smith refers to as ‘fellow-feeling’. By putting 
ourselves in the place of the other we come to not only a greater 
understanding of the others sensations, but become affected of what the 
other really feels. Fellow-feeling arises thus, not out of my own conception 
about what I think I would feel were I in the shoes of the other person, but 
out of the sensation which my conception of being in the other person's 
shoes actually generate in me. Smith gives several examples of this, where one 
is that function in all persons, that naturally makes the person imitate others 
physical sufferings e.g. in a situation just before the hard stroking of a 
persons leg, this function makes you draw back your own leg, and when it 
does hit, you actually feel the hurt in some measures (TMS I.I.I.3). But then 
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when the stroke hits, if the agent makes any violent outcries to which we 
cannot go along with, Smith argues that we never fail to despise him (TMS, 
I.II.I.5). "Pain never calls forth any very lively sympathy unless it is accompanied with 
danger." (TMS, I.II.I.9)  Here, Smith points us to a dissemination of the actual 
process of sympathising with a person exposed to physical pain. Because 
when we do so, it is in fact not the sensation of something painful about to 
happen, but rather the idea of danger and thereby the impression of fear. 
This is the process of imagination, and Smith conjectures that it is the 
immediateness of it, which governs our ability to sympathise with such agent.  
"What at first disturbs us is not the object of the senses, but the idea of the 
imagination. As it is an idea, therefore, which occasions our uneasiness, till 
time and other accidents have in some measure effaced it from our 
memory, the imagination continues to fret and rankle within, from the 
thought of it." (TMS, I.II.I.8)  
Conversely, if we instead picture the situation where an agent is in good 
physical health, but some mischief of fortune has befallen him so that he 
should loose all of his valuables. Everything he suffers takes its origin in his 
own imagination (TMS, I.II.I.6), and we sympathise with him more naturally 
than with any bodily sensation because his ideas of dependence, neglect of 
his friends, loss of dignity and general misery, are able to mould themselves 
in our imagination more easily.  
That the imagination enables us to experience the emotions of others doesn't 
mean that we feel exactly the same as the person principally concerned, but 
that we form emotions of our own, based on how we conceive that which 
excited the emotion in the agent - the intensity of which, depends on ”the 
vivacity or dullness of the conception” (TMS p. 9). One will never feel exactly the 
same as the other person, but it is the same feeling, only in one degree or the 
other. One can easily mistake this aspect of imagining oneself in the place of 
the agent, with, imagining being the agent in his own place. Through 
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secondary literature we have come to be aware that Smith specifically wants 
us to understand the latter. These two quotes are brought to illustrate this  
"But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary 
change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this 
imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and 
character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize." (TMS, 
VII.III.I.4, via Haakonssen, 2006, p163)  
“Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, 
as from that of the situation which excites it. We sometimes feel for 
another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; 
because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our 
breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality.” 
(TMS, I.I.I.10)  
And as we noted earlier on the comparison to Hume, Smith differs exactly 
here in that the sympathetic feelings which we muster from an agent might 
not correlate with the passions the agent expresses (like in TMS, I.I.I.4)9. This 
should raise some spontaneous alertness when we read Smith, because what 
this comes down to is a justification of an outside person to criticise the 
sovereignity and authenticity of an agent's original passions – something 
which at least in our century of individualism, seems unthinkable to question 
(or at least, we consider it the profession of the counsellor by means of 
rhetoric’s to persuade us that we feel in a specific way).  
2.4.1 The problem of imagining being in the others situation 
As the concept of Sympathy, most nakedly put, is the blunt ability to put 
oneself in the situation of the other - that is, to imagine being the agent in the 
situation of the agent - we believe Smith is basing moral sentiments on a 
foundation which is a bit naive in todays modern context. In a modern 
individualised society so many different realities (disparate in kind) seem to 
                                                
9 What it entails is that, in this way, it is possible to sympathise both with the dead and with people who has 
lost their reason (TMS, I.I.I.13). 
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coexist that the premise of imagining ourselves in the place of the other 
(TMS, I.I.I.2) seems an empty requisite. What constitutes the reality of a 
given person is not just the person's bare surroundings, nor Smith's proposed 
causality of his actions. It is also how the person him/herself perceives all 
these things (TMS, I.I.IV.5), and their temperament or behavioural traits. It is 
this question of own perception which Smith seems to have highly 
flattened/neutralised in order to make sense of Sympathy. He argues for 
instance that it is the nature of humans to seek to be understandable by 
others (TMS, I.I.IV.7), and that we therefore instantaneously flatten out our 
sentiments and actions, allowing spectators to sympathise entirely with us.  
This ability of putting oneself in the situation of another is such a certain fact 
for Smith: 1) we see a person, 2) then we see the objects/events and third 
parties around the person principally concerned and 3) then we are 
legitimised in any further judgments of the agent by the fact that we have 
experienced (by imagination) that agents situation ("upon all occasions his 
[the spectator] own sentiments are the standards and measures by which he 
judges" (TMS, I.I.III.1)). The first thing that we will question is the rationality 
of saying that we are able to imagine what other people feel, or at all put 
ourselves in their situation really.  
We walk along the sidewalk of central Copenhagen. Looking to the one side 
we see a person with all the countenances of deep sorrow but don't know 
anything of the person's situation. Fair enough, Smith have made precautions 
for this and states that to the extent that we are immediately presented with 
information as to the cause of the agents affliction, that "upon the consciousness 
of this conditional sympathy, that our approbation of his sorrow is founded" (TMS, 
I.I.III.4). The existence of information is the conditionality of Sympathy. If 
such information was not presented, resentment of the agent is fairly 
expected due to our not being able to sympathise with their emotional 
sentiments from the situation we observe of them. In a modern context we 
Human Moral Nature 
Page 33 of 66 
would probably say that Smith's conjecture is rude, and instead we would feel 
resentful towards a person who resented an agent in the street in sorrow.  
2.5 Chapter summary  
What should be remembered from this chapter is the procedural structure 
that lies in Smith's concept of Sympathy - that we imagine being in the 
situation of the agent and that we thereby come to have emotions which may 
or may not concord with the passions observed in the agent. This implies, 
that for Smith, the concept of sympathy has been attributed an extended 
meaning through his application of it to include not just sentiments such as 
grief or the like, but instead applying a neutrality to it, so as it both covers 
sorrowful as well as joyous sentiments. The notion is further elaborated on 
through the terms of, approbation/ disapprobation and propriety/ 
impropriety. Lastly, our findings show, that imagination plays a fundamental 
role in explaining the concept of sympathy for Smith, as this in a way should 
be seen as the basis of this concept. 
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3 MORALITY  
As shown in the previous chapter, the human capability to sympathise, Smith 
claims, is used as an immediate judgement of the actions of others. In 
explaining this, he introduces the terms fellow-feeling, propriety / impropriety and 
approbation / disapprobation to describe our assessment of the action. In this 
chapter we start off by going further into the process of judgement, especially 
in relation to the judgement of others judgements. Then, the notion of 
merit/demerit will be thoroughly examined along with the sentiments of 
gratitude/resentment. Concluding the chapter, we have devoted a couple of 
pages to a turn in Smith’s theory, which we have called ‘the objectification of 
judgement’ - the special way by which it seems Smith lifts the process of 
judgment out of the field of the individual and into the field of the society.  
3.1 Judging others judgments  
What does happen when you judge of the propriety or impropriety of 
another person’s judgment? Situations as these are split in two: 1) where there 
is a special relation between the agent/spectator and the objects exciting 
passion (=consequent objects of our conduct) and 2) where there is no such 
special relation. The cases where there is no such relation, Smith enlists as 
including that of nature, philosophy, art, but also the conduct of a third 
person (TMS, I.I.IV.2). To this point, there may be some complications, 
which we return to later. The propriety or impropriety of the sentiment of 
the other (the judgment we state over him) depends on whether or whether 
not, concordance is found between our own sentiment towards the object 
and his sentiment towards the object. But even though we judge the 
sentiment of the other person as being proper, it will not cause any notable 
praise or admiration, as the object has no peculiar relation to either of us (so 
for instance, if a man puts his chair under the tableside, and that action 
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means nothing to both of us, that action does not deserve praise or 
admiration) and should we judge differently, this would not be the cause of 
any serious dispute according to Smith (TMS, I.I.IV.5).    
In the cases where there in fact exist a relation between the object and either 
you or the other person, the matter is more delicate. Where there in the case 
with no peculiar relation to the object for either you or the other was little risk 
of quarrelling upon a disagreement upon the propriety or impropriety of the 
sentiment towards the object, the cases regarding objects with affection to 
either of you, any disapprobation (disagreeability) of sentiments becomes 
grim not just for the conversation, but the company as well (TMS, I.I.IV.5).  
From this, the question arises concerning the graduation of one’s relation to 
the object concerned. Where is one to draw the limit between when, or when 
not you in fact have a direct relation to a given object and does this comes in 
different degrees? Smith is very elusive on this point as he does not give any 
propositions regarding this aspect at all. How would Smith for instance 
interpret a term such as ideology in this regard? Would he say that one could 
have a special relationship to a book, or a philosophy for instance? Or would 
he say that this is something that is so particular to the individual that no 
general rule could be applied in explaining this properly. Is Smith simply 
implying that it is sufficient for making his points clear to keep his theory on 
a simple level? 
If we once again look to the judgement of another’s judgement towards an 
object, Smith stresses the point that, it becomes crucial for the spectator, as 
much as he can to put himself in the case of the other, providing there is just 
the slightest degree of corresponding sentiments between the spectator and 
the agent (TMS, I.I.IV.6). Let us examine this more closely. In some ways it 
actually dovetails back to the opening sentence of the TMS about sympathy 
(cf. introduction), but on a completely different premise. Where we in the 
opening sentence were dealing with a descriptive statement of the nature of 
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human beings, this statement is explicitly prescriptive as to what man ought to 
do in case of this or that - “the spectator must endeavour as much is he can to put 
himself in the case of the other” (TMS, I.I.IV.6). This can be seen in Smith’s use of 
claims, such as “the spectator must […] as much as he can [...and...] He must adopt” 
(TMS, I.I.IV.6). This method of linking different parts of the theory together 
by means of descriptive and prescriptive elements is something that is in fact 
general to the TMS. There are obvious problematics related to this: Although 
Smith in the example above, separate the prescriptive statement and the 
descriptive statement into different sentences, it has the inexpedient 
consequence of making the prescriptive assertion into something which 
seems like a natural consequence of what he earlier described, and thereby in 
a way camouflages the prescriptivism of his last statement. 
Several other places throughout the TMS, are there due to Smith’s 
argumentation places where it in fact is hard to distinguish the ‘is’ and ‘ought’s’ 
from each other. Consider for example this quote in the ending of part II, 
section I:  
“We are not at present examining upon what principles a perfect being 
would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles 
so weak and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it. 
The principles which I have just now mentioned, it is evident, have a very 
great effect upon his sentiments; and it seems wisely ordered that it should 
be so” (TMS, II.I.10, own underlining). 
Here again, Smith employs a ‘camouflage-technique’ in making the last 
sentence (the underlined part) seem as a natural consequence of the 
foregoing. Throughout the TMS, Smith jumps back and forth from stating 
something generally descriptive about human moral and of the mechanism 
implied, to coming with his own prescriptive ideal about what this 
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necessitates of mankind10. 
3.2 Merit and demerit  
Sentiments can be considered in regard to two different aspects (TMS, 
I.I.III.5 and II.I.intro.2). The first has to do with the cause or objects that 
excites it, of the propriety or impropriety of the consequent action and is 
dependent on “another object” (that being for instance another person, 
event, idea etc.). An example could be our own judgement of another man’s 
joy which we have judged being excessive in consideration to the cause that 
excited it, and thus improper (TMS, I.I.III.8). This is what we have been 
examining so far in this project. 
The second aspect, which we address now,  relates to the effect it tends to 
produce (TMS, I.I.III.5 and II.I.intro.2) and it is here that the case of either 
merit or demerit enters: 
[…] upon the beneficial or hurtful effect, which the affection proposes or 
tends to produce, depends the merit or demerit, the good or ill desert of the 
action to which it gives occasion (TMS II.I.intro.2).  
The combination of these two aspects enables us to reach another judgment 
with regard to the agent. By judging the propriety of the sentiment behind 
action, and the beneficence which that action entailed, we come to get a 
(collective) view of the virtuousness of that action.   
In this sense, merit and demerit have to do with the qualities of certain 
actions and conducts of man. Going along with the example of the 
excessively joyous man from before, according to this aspect of the 
judgement, we consider not just the propriety or impropriety of the action, 
                                                
10 For more examples, see: TMS; II.I.IV.2: “His actions seems then …”, II.I.IV.4:  “Such actions seems then …”, 
II.I.V.8: “Nature, however…”, II.II.I.10: “The violator of the laws of justice ought …”. 
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but also the ruinous effect it, according to us, is likely to produce. If actions 
are merited, they deserve reward and conversely, if they are demerited, they 
deserve punishment. The two most recognisable sentiments in regard to the 
approbation or disapprobation of a certain conduct (or proposed conduct), is 
gratitude and resentment, because of their immediate effect to prompt us 
towards reward or punishment (TMS, II.I.I.2). How are these returned? In 
short, Smith says 
to reward […] is to return good to good received. To punish […] it is to 
return evil for evil that has been done (TMS, II.I.I.4).  
Upon looking at the last sentence of this quote, one could easily be mistaken 
in thinking that Smith here actually advocates for the notion of ‘an eye for an 
eye’, but the matter is somewhat more complicated. Let us therefore go 
deeper into the pairs of gratitude/reward and resentment/punishment.  
3.2.1 Gratitude and resentment  
The last quote in the preceding section implies that in order to obtain 
satisfaction from gratitude, the beneficiary must remunerate the person who 
was the cause of the beneficent action, the benefactor. In this respect it is not 
simply enough that the person you are grateful towards is blessed by luck and 
manages quite well on his own hand for your gratitude to be alleviated, as this 
will not have allowed you to show and directly act upon your gratefulness 
towards the benefactor. Although the luck of your benefactor would please 
your happiness towards him, one would still feel a debt, for not having been 
the one causing his good fortune.  
It is somewhat the same principle that is implied with resentment, although 
with minor but important differences. Although, your hatred to a person that, 
for example, has killed your father might be soothed if some great misfortune 
occurred to the offender which would result in his death, this would not fulfil 
your resentment towards the agent (TMS, II.I.I.6). As Smith puts it,      
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Resentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made 
to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have 
suffered from him (the TMS, II.I.I.6).  
With gratitude one would satisfy his sentiment by being himself the one that 
repays the person to whom he for instance where indebted to. This could be 
said to, at least until a certain amount, entail that the recompense would have 
to be concerned with the particular merited action which caused the 
sentiment of gratification. As of what concerns resentment, it would in even 
greater extent have to deal with the particular action offended towards one 
self. However here, it would not imply you to act directly toward the offender 
(return evil for evil that has been done), as this would of course be against the 
law, and this is where the discussion about ‘an eye for an eye comes in. To 
this notion (returning evil for evil that has been done) Smith even adds, that 
if he “had the least spark of justice […] it would hurt him excessively to have been 
himself, even without design, the occasion of his misfortune” (TMS, II.I.I.6).  This point 
about justice will be elaborated later in this chapter. 
As the case is for sympathy with the prosperity of others or the like good 
fortune, so is it with gratitude. You enliven (through sympathising with the 
agent and coming to feel the same gratitude as he feels) the gratitude of the 
receiving person (or as Smith put it, the person acted upon) and in that way you 
feel gratitude towards the benefactor as if it was upon you the friendly service 
had been done. The same goes for resentment, though of course the opposite 
way around (TMS, II.I.II.5). That is, because the spectator is able to 
sympathise with the agent acted upon, the spectator 'adopts some of his 
resentment' towards the violator as if it was the spectator herself, the 
malevolence had been done to.  
The differentiation, which Smith imparts between returning resentment and 
gratitude is of some significance. It has to do with the matter of justice, but 
before we go further into this subject, instead let us go deeper into the 
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implications of the terms gratitude and resentment in consideration to merit 
and demerit. That is to say, how Smith extends the subject matter of the 
theory to a more general level and thereby moves the focus from the 
subjectivity of morality towards a greater extent of a societal morality.  
3.3 The objectification of judgement  
When an object is to be considered proper of either gratitude or resentment, 
it is to be regarded as being something which, “naturally seems proper, and is 
approved of” (TMS, II.I.II.1). Smith continues to elaborate of what is meant by 
natural in the succeeding paragraph, 
[…] these [passions (gratitude and resentment)] as well as every other 
passions of human nature, seem proper and approved of, when the heart of 
every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every 
indifferent by-stander entirely enters into and goes along with them. (TMS 
III.I.II.2, own underlining)  
“The heart of every impartial spectator” and “every indifferent by-stander” is underlined 
here, because it marks a significant step in Smith’s theory. When introducing 
the word every, it extends the meaning of sympathy in implicating a demand 
for universality in cases concerning judgements of meritorious or 
demeritorious actions. In making the approbation of sentiments in this regard 
universal, Smith raises the individual level of the theory to a societal level. 
Gratitude and resentment is therefore to be seen only as proper and 
approved of, if it would be viewed of as such by ‘the common man’11. 
Something Smith explains in claims such as, “a resentment which the breast of every 
reasonable man is ready to adopt and sympathize with” (TMS, II.I.II.3, own 
underlining). A deserving reward or punishment is according to this a 
reflection of the societal norms. This in turn gives rise to some questions 
                                                
11 It should be noted, that Smith himself does not use the notion of a ‘common man’, but by us using the idea of the 
common man, it is introduced to emphasise the generality claim, Smith himself elaborates on, in regard to mankind’s 
judgement of certain actions as especially noted in paragraph 3 of chapter II (the TMS, p. 69-70). 
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concerning the approximation of how the individual deals with this, let alone 
come to the right assessment of this norm. As this particular matter however 
will be taken up more closely in the next chapter, instead let us go more into 
the matter of what our recent findings so far tell us about human moral 
nature. 
In relation to the ‘reasonable man’ phrase from before, the quote illustrates an 
aspect of the immediateness of Sympathy. If the 'reasonable man' is able to 
sympathise with an agent and find his sorrow proprietary to the object 
exciting it, then the immediateness of Sympathy will make the spectator to 
likewise enter into the abhorrence or admiration of whatever was the exciting 
object (TMS, II.I.II.5). It is this active sentiment which seems to be the force 
behind the societal desire and move for punishment. Smith writes,  
"The indolent and passive fellow–feeling, by which we accompany him in his 
sufferings, readily gives way to that more vigorous and active sentiment by 
which we go along with him [...] to gratify his aversion to what has given 
occasion to them." (TMS, II.I.II.5).  
Furthermore, this fellow-feeling have the effect to disburden the agent from 
the weight of his resentment (which makes him a little happier because 
resentment is by nature a disagreeable passion), 
“As the person who is principally interested in any event is pleased with our 
sympathy, and hurt by the want of it, so we, too, seem to be pleased when 
we are able to sympathize with him, and to be hurt when we are unable to 
do so” (TMS, I.I.II.6). 
This last quote is yet another composite in what Smith claims brings order 
into society, and thereby secures its maintenance. Humans have an intrinsic 
sense of righteousness, and by that we through sympathy find pleasure in 
enlivening the wrong done to others as well as relieve some of the grief of the  
sufferers of wrongful actions. As Smith puts it,  
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When we think of the anguish of the sufferers, [through our fellow–feeling 
with their just and natural resentment] […]; we enter with more eagerness 
into all their schemes of vengeance, and feel ourselves every moment 
wreaking, in imagination, upon such violators of the laws of society, that 
punishment which our sympathetic indignation tells us is due to their 
crimes. Our sense of the horror and dreadful atrocity of such conduct, the 
delight which we take in hearing that it was properly punished, the 
indignation which we feel when it escapes this due retaliation, our whole 
sense and feeling, in short, of its ill desert, […], arises from the sympathetic 
indignation which naturally boils up in the breast of the spectator, whenever 
he thoroughly brings home to himself the case of the sufferer (TMS, 
II.I.V.6, own underlining). 
This resentment (or sympathetic indignation as it is also labelled in the quote) 
towards ‘the violators of the laws of society’, Smith later on explain (and this 
very much support our thesis about the human sense of righteousness) has 
been given to us by nature for the purpose of being the “safeguard of justice”, 
and “the security of innocence” (II.II.I.4). Thus, the notion of the ‘violators of 
laws of society’ is underlined in the quote above, as it points to a central 
theme in the TMS, which we have examined throughout this chapter; the 
relationship between the individual and the society.  
It implies a very important distinction for Smith that can be seen as an 
example of his view on society and ultimately on his view on human nature. 
The distinction in question is that between revenge (II.I.V.8) and retaliation 
(II.I.II.5). To Smith, the notion of revenge is “the most detestable of all the 
passions” (II.I.V.8), because it is both excess of resentment, but just as 
importantly unjustified (in the sense not in concordance with the law, and 
thereby justice) ‘the return of evil for evil that has been done’. Retaliation on 
the other hand, is the justified, sacred and necessary act of returning evil for 
evil that has been done (II.I.II.5), and in that sense is the main upholder of 
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society12.  
Concluding about our findings on human moral nature, one could say that 
man is a societal being with a strict obligation to act according to justice and a 
natural love for society (TMS, II.II.I.6), which sympathy enables.   
3.4 Chapter summary 
The sense of merit / demerit is in a way a compounded sentiment. It consists 
of a direct sympathy of the particular motives and affections of the agent (the 
person who acts), as well as an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of the 
recipient (the person acted upon). This of course implies that the indirect 
sympathy is dependent on the direct sympathy. This led us on to a discussion 
of the descriptive and prescriptive elements in Smith’s theory, and where our 
investigation revealed a mix up of these different approaches.  Furthermore 
we have seen that there in some aspects of the sentiments gratitude and 
resentment exists fundamental differences, for instance in regard to the idea 
of ‘an eye for an eye’. Here our finding was that of concerning justice, 
exemplified with the fundamental difference between retaliation and revenge, 
the former being the justified way of ‘returning evil for evil done’ and the latter 
the unjustified equivalent. Consequently, Smith introduces a naturalisation of 
people’s judgements when these are concerned with the effect a passion 
tends to produce. This marks a change in the theory towards a more societal 
aspect of moral, and determining mankind as a societal being.
                                                
12 This links with Smith’s view on the role of God in all of this, as could shortly be recapitulated as being somewhat 
analogous to the notion of ‘the first mover’, relating back to antiquity. What links it particular to this point, is Smith’s notion 
of, that God created Nature, and, “Nature, antecedent to all reflections upon the utility of punishment, has in this manner stamped upon the 
human heart, in the strongest and most indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and necessary law of 
retaliation” (II.I.II.5).  
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4 THE IMPARTIAL SPECTATOR  
In the first two parts of the TMS, the propriety/impropriety of conduct, 
merit/demerit and appropriation/disappropriation of conduct amongst other 
issues have been treated in relation to sympathy and morality. Especially 
chapter three started of with a focus on the individual, moving towards a 
societal level, and it is from this societal level than this chapter now seeks to 
elaborate on. One major component in this elaboration has to do with the 
impartial spectator. 
In this chapter we initially make some main points of relevance clear 
concerning the impartial spectator and how Smith sees it relate to sympathy 
and morality. As the impartial spectator brings certain new issues to the fore 
while putting others, some more some less, in a new light, a discussion of 
how this links to the foregoing discussion about sympathy is pending. Some 
of it is here in this chapter, while some more general and conclusive points 
are brought up later in the conclusion. By examining sympathy and its 
relation to the impartial spectator we want to scrutinize and reflect on how, 
in a wide sense, sympathy explains human moral nature, comment on the 
theoretical framework and notice what can be said from that. 
In the beginning of part III of the TMS (TMS, p. 109-10), Smith argues that 
one major reason for us to need an impartial spectator in our moral life is 
that we have no other way of judging our own sentiments and motives. We 
need something from outside ourselves to inform us, so we use our 
imagination and create an impartial spectator: 
“Whatever judgment we can form concerning them [our sentiments and 
motives], accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to 
what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we 
imagine, ought to be the judgment of others. We endeavor to examine our 
own conduct as any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.” 
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(TMS, III.I.2) 
This brings up some questions in relation to morality and sympathy. For 
instance why we care what other people think. Another question is what 
“ought” to be the judgment of others - does this have the same 
propriety/impropriety as earlier in TMS or is there something else to 
consider? Because now it is not merely ourselves that are the judges of other 
people but ourselves that judge from the point of view of a general equitable 
ideal which we bring into play imaginatively (TMS, III.I.2). We are still the 
judges, only we cannot rely on our faculty of sympathy to inform us, at least 
not directly and naturally as with regards to others’ behavior, and moreover 
we cannot rely on other people to always be fair and impartial, we need to 
figure out what “ought to be the judgment of others” about our behavior and 
motives. 
4.1 To be lovely 
According to Smith we seek to fulfill two main objects by use of the impartial 
spectator; when we are being judged by others we seek to get praise and 
avoid blame, and on the other hand when we judge of ourselves we desire 
praise-worthiness and have an aversion to blame-worthiness (TMS, p. 131). 
The first object arises very much from our being together with other people, 
being in society. If we always were alone we would have no care for it 
because it would not give rise to joy or sorrow, but as social moral beings the 
judgment of other people interests us highly. The quote below concerns the 
man in solitude which is brought into society:   
“He will observe that mankind approve of some of them [his passions], and 
are disgusted by others. He will be elevated in the one case, and cast down 
in the other […] they will now therefore interest him deeply, and often call 
upon his most attentive consideration” (TMS, p. 111) 
There can however be a discrepancy to the latter object; namely to the 
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worthiness we crave. For instance if we are unjustly applauded or blamed we 
do not accept it because we from nature are endowed with a real love for 
virtue (TMS, p. 117):  
“Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a desire of being 
approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of 
being what he himself approves of in other men.” (TMS, p. 112)  
Here we see that Smith implicitly links this with the two foregoing parts of 
the TMS which concerns how we sympathise with the actions of others. 
What we approve of in others we are likely to invest ourselves into: “Man 
naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely” (TMS, p. 113). In cases where 
we find other people to be lovely i.e. that their actions give rise to merit and 
approbation, so equally we desire the impartial spectator to judge of our 
motives, and if possible and if regarded by us as proper, to get people around 
us to judge of our actions. We only know of our motives, they of our action. 
However as this is an act of imagination our conviction of our worthiness 
can be shaken; we are also social beings as mentioned and are affected by the 
judgment of others, especially if they are close to us (TMS, p. 122). It is a 
matter of what our past experience tells us and how much success we have 
had in similar matters that ground our knowledge, and therefore our certainty 
of what should be approved of and hence the according weight we give to 
the judgment of other people over our own (TMS, p.123). It is a work in 
progress and it is seldom quite the same in one situation as in another.  
4.2 General Rules 
As human beings are generally highly interested in the well being and fortune 
of others and in avoiding harm to anyone (TMS, p. 9), to act in and judge of 
situations where one is a participant in the best way possible in order to reach 
this goal, ought morally to be of the essence. As noted above, this can partly 
be achieved by examining which of the actions of others we find 
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praiseworthy and then to emulate them (TMS, p. 114, 159). Smith however 
argues that when we indeed act, our attempt to act informed by the impartial 
spectator may run into some difficulties: “When we are about to act, the eagerness 
of passion will seldom allow us to consider what we are doing, with the candour of an 
indifferent person.” (TMS, p. 157). We are disturbed by our own passions, our 
own place: “where everything appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love.” (ibid). 
What we feel in the moment we act overwhelms us and seems reasonable to 
us at the time. The problem is that we act to a degree partially and do not 
grasp fully the different perspectives to the situation, and are therefore not in 
touch with our own desire to be morally virtuous, which is greatly a question 
of the natural sentiments of others, their sympathetic eye on us: “Virtue is not 
said to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own 
gratitude; but because it excites those sentiments in other men.” (TMS, p. 113). This 
issue, of praise and blame, has been touched upon in the above section, 
however it is a bit more particular when it is seen in relation to general rules, 
for instance which to follow and why and to what extent; so we choose to say 
something about it here as well. In relation to the above point about 
worthiness we can see from the quote below how it links with general rules; 
the rules have to be adhered to sincerely: 
“But we should by no means regard him [who acted only from a rule] with 
that respect and esteem which would seem due to one who, upon a like 
occasion, had acted properly from a just sense of what was proper to be 
done. No action can properly be called virtuous which is not accompanied 
with the sentiment of self- approbation.” (TMS, p. 178) 
So to be virtuous our act has to beat time with our own sense of it, but for 
the virtuous act to be merited, others must agree. The problem is that we are 
not very proficient in redirecting our poor behavior after it has taken place, in 
the afterthought, when we should be more at ease, more impartial; partly 
because now in retrospect it does not seem as important and imminent as 
before, but also more importantly because as Smith argues: It is a human 
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faculty to find it disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, we are so bad at 
correcting our own behavior that we often end up doing the same mistakes 
(TMS, p. 158). Smith is stating this rather firmly by adding: “This self-deceit, this 
fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life.” (ibid). It 
could be questioned whether it is perhaps too strong a statement: are people 
generally so vain as not to learn from wrong doing? Are not the ill feelings 
towards oneself a shout from within for a remedy of one’s conduct? Maybe 
however this is the other “half”, still this does not say much, therefore it 
could be interesting to discuss this further as it is very important for Smith; as 
a point in his theory by which he is able to account for the making of general 
rules in the manner that he does. Still this discussion will be better informed 
and better connected with other issues if we wait to elaborate on it until later 
in the finalizing chapters of this project. So let us rather make way now for 
how Smith accounts for general rules of morality and how it relates to our 
focus in this project.  
As mentioned above the difficulty to correct our own conduct from 
experiences of that very conduct, we need to learn from how the way 
behavior of others affect us, learn what is proper and fit that to the 
circumstances at hand (TMS, p. 159) at times we find that “some of their 
actions shock all our natural sentiments” (ibid). Additionally we take into 
account what third person participant say of them as they can strengthen our 
newly acquired resolve.  
“We thus naturally lay down to ourselves a general rule, that all such 
actions are to be avoid, as tender to render us odious, contemptible, or 
punishable, the objects of all those sentiments for which we have the 
greatest dread and aversion. Other actions, on the contrary, call forth our 
approbation […] They excite all those sentiments for which we have by 
nature the strongest desire; the love, the gratitude, the admiration of 
mankind” (TMS, p. 159) 
An important point which Smith stresses is that this does not run from the 
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general to the particular; we do not initially approve or condemn an action 
merely because it accords with some general rule, rather the general rule is 
formed “by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in 
a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of” (TMS, p. 159). Smith mentions 
how good and bad actions of others naturally excite respectively good and 
bad sentiments in the spectator (TMS, p. 160) So particular instances inform 
and shape the rules, in a complicated reality we must take account of the 
particularities in their own respect and not enforce some general accepted 
rule on them, nevertheless it is possible to create rules to some extent. 
Moreover it is important that we are aware of why and how some actions and 
motives are within the scope of a general rule: “we should consider the end and 
foundation of the rule, more than the rule itself” (TMS, p. 175) In other words we 
must keep our moral diligence, be conscious about why we have a tendency 
to sympathise with some actions and not others, in order to update our 
impartial spectator on the world. Except for justice, which among other 
things concerns that which is forbidden because it involves hurting other 
people in some way, the general rules of the virtues e.g. prudence, charity, 
generosity, gratitude and friendship, are often loose, inaccurate and admit 
many exceptions (TMS, p. 174) This is why we need to be in touch with our 
moral sentiments in order to be morally virtuous: “our conduct should rather be 
directed by a certain idea of propriety, by a certain taste for a particular tenor of conduct, 
than by any regard to a precise maxim or rule” (TMS, p. 175). This is a prescription 
by Smith more than a description. He is aware that this is not always the case, 
our norms or our “concurring sentiments” are formed in society (TMS, p. 160) 
and are guiding our behavior: 
“we frequently appeal to them as to the standards of judgment, in debating 
concerning the degree of praise or blame that is due to certain actions of a 
complication or dubious nature” (TMS, p. 160) 
After saying this Smith argues that this is where many eminent authors have 
gone wrong, in their attempt to make general rules of which they try to fit 
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particular actions. It is the wrong direction he claims. But is this “wrong” 
direction not precisely the direction it takes sometimes? As we see it, from 
relating to our lives and the world around us from our common sense; 
motives and actions are to a high degree affected by norms, where many 
norms differ from one country to another, from culture to culture, and 
within cultures. These norms are if not explicitly conveyed by speech then 
implicitly communicated by behavior. They are highly influential. So the 
question is: How free are we to inform ourselves about rules from 
particularities in our lives and how greatly are we merely adhering knowingly 
or not the norms of society or social spheres within it? How free are we to do 
what Smith is ultimately claiming: namely that to rely on our natural moral 
sentiments, on sympathy, both in forming general rules, and in being diligent 
to their modifications and exceptions. Additionally we must scrutinize the 
information we get from others, firstly from their actions and how we 
sympathize with them, but also secondly from their opinions about the rules, 
which we must weigh against our own point of view. (TMS, p. 126). It is very 
much a question of certainty. The question is how well of we are to acquire 
such certainty. How well we are of in figuring out how to settle 
inconsistencies between the freedom and capacity to judge according to own 
premises, about what is proper and maybe virtuous, versus the attachment we 
have to the norms of society. To this Smith states later in the TMS that we 
do not let the form of our conduct be directed more than to a certain degree:  
“The principles of the imagination, upon which our sense of beauty 
depends, are of a very nice and delicate nature, and may easily be altered 
by habit and education: but the sentiments of moral approbation, are 
founded on the strongest and most vigorous passions of human nature; and 
though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted.” (TMS, 
p. 200) 
If this is the case, then human nature has made it so that particulars are 
attended to, what can be questioned is the degree of this attendance. 
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Another question in this same context is what it means to be morally certain. 
Is a person who is certain in many of her motives and actions more reliable, 
more apt to act correctly morally and to be deemed virtuous? Be more 
assured of herself in doing right? And could one person not experience the 
same moral sentiments as another to the same situations, but still be more 
insecure about them? Are people different in this respect? We will leave this 
discussion for later and make an effort now to elucidate some related issues 
in TMS first. For instance on the question of what to do when one is 
uncertain of the right action, uncertain of what is considered proper and 
virtuous, to this Smith argues that prudence is at all times a good idea: “The 
common proverbial maxims of prudence, being founded in universal experience, are perhaps 
the best general rules which can be given about it [about the general rules of the virtues]” 
(TMS, p. 174) What does it mean to be prudent generally speaking? As 
mentioned it is not a completely strict maxim, however interestingly Smith 
believes that self-command is prudent with regards to the impartial spectator, 
something he connects with the stoical way of conceiving morality. We turn 
the attention to this issue now as it may indicate what in Smith’s view we 
ought to do to act properly, and if possible virtuously, and how this relates 
our moral nature. 
4.3 A Gentleman’s Morality? 
As already some light has been shed on earlier in this project to open up the 
possibility of other people coming to terms with our passions, to sympathize 
with us, we need to bring the passions to a level which they can go along 
with, we must “flatten” them so to speak, because other people cannot 
entirely go along with them in their full pitch, in their complete “sharpness” 
(TMS, p. 22). This is a rather central theme for Smith in the TMS and it paves 
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the way for his adherence a morality, which resembles the Stoic13 one. While 
Stoicism is quite radical and might be deemed a bit apathetic, Smith states 
that although his moral philosophy has some tenants resembling the Stoic 
one, it should merely be conceived as something which we should aim at 
achieving, while its perfection is hardly acquired: 
“Though few men have the stoical idea of what this perfect propriety 
requires, yet all men endeavour in some measure to command themselves, 
and to bring down their selfish passions to something which their neighbour 
can go along with […] But this can never be done so effectually as by 
viewing whatever befals […] themselves in the light in which their 
neighbours are apt to view it. The stoical philosophy, in this respect does 
little more than unfold our natural ideas of perfection” (TMS, p. 141) 
So we have to invoke self-command over our passions. Smith argues that this 
is because the impartial spectator indulges us to this behaviour; the nature of 
our moral sentiments, our sympathetic faculty calls upon us not to be selfish, 
as we often are when we are alone. We “ought” to restrain ourselves as an 
element of the above mentioned prudence in all social situations, to act so 
that we do not prioritise ourselves over others:  
“a voice [the impartial spectator] capable of astonishing the most 
presumptuous of our passions , that we are but one of the multitude, in no 
respect better than any other in it; and that when we prefer ourselves so 
shamefully and so blindly to others, we become the proper objects of 
resentment, abhorrence, and extraction.” (TMS, p. 137)  
If we are successful in this endeavour we are pleased with ourselves, we see 
                                                
13
 “Stoicism was one of the new philosophical movements of the Hellenistic period. The name derives from the porch 
(stoa poikilê) in the Agora at Athens decorated with mural paintings, where the members of the school congregated, and 
their lectures were held. Unlike ‘epicurean,’ the sense of the English adjective ‘stoical’ is not utterly misleading with 
regard to its philosophical origins. The Stoics did, in fact, hold that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual 
attachments, or passionate love of anything whatsoever) either were, or arose from, false judgements and that the 
sage—a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection—would not undergo them.” 
(plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism) 
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that we are now “lovely” and in harmony with others, both by self-command 
of our own passion but also in our sympathetic sensibility to those of others, 
and from this we get self-approbation: “We frequently remember our sensibility to 
the misfortune of others with pleasure and satisfaction. We can seldom remember that to 
our own, without some degree of shame and humiliation” (TMS, p. 145) This is what 
we ought to seek according to Smith, to be perfect gentlemen and ladies in 
our conduct, stay quiet about our own concerns to a high degree, and indulge 
in the passions of others as much as possible. So to link this to the above 
mentioned prudence, when in doubt about what is proper, we should refrain 
from conveying our feelings to others too much. However there is some 
ambiguity in this, because if this is morally the right thing to do and people 
behave in this way, then will they ‘cancel’ each other out? Meaning that none 
of them express much emotion, while they are more apt to listen; then there 
is little to sympathize with because of this approximation towards saying little 
concerning oneself. This however is perhaps to draw the lines a bit sharply, 
and Smith undoubtedly does not have such an extreme in mind, but seems 
rather to notify of what counts as certain morally sound behavior in many 
cases. However the question remains if this really is morally right always, after 
all there are many ways to express ones emotions. It is possible to tell a joke 
for instance, or some funny or exciting anecdote which relates to one’s own 
emotions, which is entertaining to the spectator, but which at the same time 
implicitly tells a quite different story, which directs attention to where we are 
mentally. Does this count as perhaps a refined form of self-command? We 
are certainly expressing ourselves and are not restrained. It seems that Smith’s 
notion of self-command might be a bit ascetic at times. Let us discuss this 
further later on and instead make some other points clear in relation to self-
command, e.g. how it is when we are with friends, how we it relates to self-
approbation and also see how it connects with the above mentioned 
certainty.   
Human Moral Nature 
Page 55 of 66 
4.3.1 Self command 
If we are with friends or people of close relation, our openness of our own 
emotions might flow more freely, than when with strangers, because they 
know us better than most, we are here more certain of propriety because we 
also know them better, they will tolerate more. They might even desire to 
hear us lament or express joy. In such cases our self-command might have an 
opposite propriety, because we give them joy by not issuing too much self-
command. Smith says little of this in those parts we have focused on in the 
TMS, he accounts for it briefly though, but this has to do with a time of 
distress of a person, when he is in need of his friends, and is therefore not 
really an account of it in general:  
“The presence of the latter [of friends], it is thought, will impose less 
restraint than that of the former [of strangers] and the sufferers can more 
easily accommodate themselves to the feelings of those, from whom they 
have reason to expect more indulgent sympathy” (TMS, p. 146) 
Smith however states that a really wise and just man will issue a high level of 
self-command even in cases like this one: “He does not merely affect the sentiments 
of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them” (TMS, p. 147). Is self-command 
really always is as much called for as Smith proclaims and does it perhaps 
sometimes indeed amount to the opposite of right conduct? Moreover Smith 
connects self-command greatly to self-approbation, we are happy if we are 
able to restrain our immediate passions: 
“The degree of self-approbation with which every man, upon such 
occasions, surveys his own conduct, is higher or lower, exactly in proportion 
to the degree of self-command which is necessary to obtain that self-
approbation” (TMS, p. 147)  
This amounts to say that when we do not issue much self-command, we are 
likely to feel a lower degree of self-approbation. The question is if this is the 
case always, if not sometimes in the complicated reality the opposite is indeed 
Module 1 - Philosophy, 2008 
Page 56 of 66 
called for, and if not that then ought in the same way to give self-
approbation. Self-approbation is central in Smith’s framework, and it does 
not seem to be inconsistent as such with how it may be found in reality; still, 
it could be argued that people do not always obtain self-approbation when 
they issue self-command, it might not always coincide with self-command. 
Smith covers this though to some extent by arguing that this is why we need 
general rules; but in the same turn he states the above quoted: “No action can 
properly be called virtuous which is not accompanied with the sentiment of self- 
approbation” (TMS, p. 178). Do we really need this sentiment of self-
approbation, this pleasure to be virtuous? And vice-versa, does virtuous 
behavior indeed always give self-approbation? Could we not be aware (from a 
just sense) of our virtuous act, and hence not merely act by a rule, and still 
not experience any self-approbation? Our uneasiness with this claims stems 
from the way Smith is stating it rather firmly as to claim something universal. 
When we ‘bring it home’ to ourselves we are able shadow it with some 
doubts. 
Returning to the notion of our certainty of the propriety of our sentiments, 
Smith states that this has to do with how other people react to them: “Our 
certainty concerning our own merit, and our anxiety to think favorably of it, should together 
naturally enough make us desirous to know the opinion of other people concerning it” 
(TMS, p. 126). This might unveil a slight paradox in what Smith is saying, 
because if we are to gain certainty about our own moral worthiness, judge 
whether or not we deserve merit, then we must attend the school of self-
command to experience where and when self-command is called for. Smith 
argues that: “Hardships, dangers, injuries, misfortunes, are the only master under whom 
we can learn exercise of this virtue [of self-command]. But these are all masters to whom 
nobody willingly puts himself to school” (TMS, p. 153). The paradox is that if we 
take self-command to be something generally virtuous then to have an overall 
self-command, to seek the Stoic perfection, is to make an effort to avoid that 
from happening which teaches self-command. It works against itself, 
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something to do and not to do at the same time. Which means that we 
cannot be certain if a situation promotes having self-command if it indeed is 
not put to the test. In turn therefore if we often issue a high self-command, 
we will know little of what other people think of our passions. It appears that 
this Stoic ideal is not without its anomalies. However much suggests that 
Smith is not this stringent although he seems a bit ambiguous on this point. 
He speaks of it as an “idea of perfection” and not something occurring in 
reality. He does not claim that we in fact always have self-command, but that 
we should seek it. So, one might say that we naturally learn it, because we 
find that it is the proper conduct in many cases according to the TMS. It is 
learning by doing, and as a novice in this school we will meet with self-
disapprobation and will experience that other people may not sympathize 
with us and even be appalled our behavior. Again it depends on their 
schooling as well: “The man who feels the most for the joys and sorrows of others, is best 
fitted for acquiring the most complete control of his own joys and sorrows” (TMS, p. 152). 
This might sound a bit odd; why should restraining oneself make it easier to 
be sympathetic to the passions of others? Is it not precisely what one should 
do in many cases? Namely express one’s feelings, especially bad ones, to not 
keep them building up inside, or some other reasons for expression oneself 
happily or sadly? Make other people laugh for instance, make them in a better 
mood, or just to learn them something new? Many modern norms, as we see 
it, would hardly fully accord with Smith in this point of view. At least in the 
above quote he seems to see it very much in ‘black and white’, he makes little 
room for the grey-zone occurrences of the everyday. We will dwell more on 
this curiosity later. Let us for now consider from what we have dealt with 
here in this chapter, why it is that Smith makes this assertion. Smith claims 
that self-command and feeling for the joys and sorrows of other people are 
part of the same instinct from nature, come from the same “manhood” (TMS, 
p. 152). This we interpret and analyze as a logical conclusion from making 
general rules about; on one hand other people’s sympathetic behavior and on 
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the other about self-command. Put differently: We observe how and when 
other people are sympathetic with us and seek to emulate it and we observe 
how and when other people are less sympathetic and therefore issue self-
command. This, according to the TMS, should be a sought way to behave 
morally. But while this seems rather a crude way to conceive of it, much 
effort has put in making a central point clear, namely that it is not easy not be 
in control of such behavior, to make rules of it, it is complicated. Most of all, 
moral behavior, according to Smith, needs to be practiced.  
4.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have touched upon some issues and raised some questions 
with regard to the impartial spectator. Initially we provided a definition of the 
impartial spectator, which led to the question concerning what others think 
of us, what they ought to think and why we should care. From this starting 
point there was an analysis of how Smith renders blame and praise and 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness and what they mean to a moral 
person, relating to his own morality and to that of others. Certainty of this 
relies heavily on the foregoing success a person has had in similar matters. In 
the subchapter labeled “General rules” this thread was continued, but 
however in a slightly different light, now these same questions of certainty 
concerned the creation of general rules; rules which are necessary because 
human beings are too immersed in their own passionate world, when in need 
to be impartial, to have assurance of acting proper. Additionally after the 
action has taken place, there is a problem, a problem of self-deceit. 
Concerning the general rules, it is important for Smith that people keep a 
keen eye on the particularities more than the rules as they are shaped entirely 
by them: it runs from the particular to the general. The rules have many 
modifications and exceptions, save for those applying to justice which are 
rather strict. We must rely on our sympathetic faculty in informing us about 
creating the rules ultimately, also when we get advice from others. The best 
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we can do is to try to be prudent at all times. This is taken up further in the 
subchapter labeled “A Gentleman’s Morality”, where this prudence is linked 
to the Stoic prudence of self-command, which Smith adheres to. What it 
amounts to is to indulge in others sorrow and joy as much as possible and to 
keep a lid on one’s own, at least for what other people cannot understand. If 
we are able to do this we get self-approbation. It can be difficult to beat time 
with one’s own morality so to speak, reality has many particularities. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
According to Smith humans are highly dependent on their sympathy to 
inform their moral certainty. By 'sympathy' is to be understood, the 
mechanism by which a person comes to feel what the emotions of another 
person is, they are excited by the a given object of that emotion. This moral 
certainty is important to inform our general moral rules, so that we do not 
become too dependent on what the norms dictate and what other people say, 
or to know when these deserve to be adhered to, know when they are truly in 
harmony with our deepest faculty of desire, to the worthy moral beings. What 
we need is to rely heavily on our imagination and our natural sympathetic 
precision. Ultimately we are alone with our moral assessment. If we want to 
be assured that our ‘places shifting’ with other people we must make sure that 
they fully comprehend our passions and we theirs. Often this entails bringing 
our passions to a level that others can go along with, the same is true for 
them. Moreover many deeply felt emotions, such as love, are more difficult 
to convey to a strange company. Human moral nature with regards to 
sympathy then is very much a process of bridging a gap. We want to be loved 
and want this love to be deserved. We will that we also love the love others 
have for us. Something suggests that what Smith is saying is that sympathy 
explains how human beings, have a detest for desolation, both emotionally 
and physically, seek to be together with their fellow beings through a real 
bond. Otherwise it will not lessen the loneliness, it might even make it worse. 
The sentiments have to be true. We need to train our morality to achieve this, 
so to speak. But it is not something selfish, if the gap between us is to be 
bridged, we must be sincere. Otherwise we will not be able to make friends to 
tie closer sympathetic relations with, where we can sympathise even closer 
with in both directions. If we did all this without any indication of when our 
sentiments and those of others were in agreement we should soon be lost in 
this complex investigation. For us to be truly moral, acting right as often as 
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possible, we need know our selves very well, we need to be highly conscious 
about what we feel and what the differences between our pleasure, 
indifference and sorrow tells us about the behaviour of others, because if we 
are not aware of this, we cannot know how to behave morally towards 
others. For us to be sympathetic we need, according to Smith, first and 
foremost to find it pleasurable to know that others feel much in the same way 
as we do, in many of the same situations. Or that we are able to bring 
ourselves closer to them from our imagination. Human moral nature 
explained by sympathy in the TMS is comprised of indicators in our 
emotions of when we are in the right and in the wrong assessment of how to 
make others feel pleasure, be happy, feel loved etc. much in the same way as 
we ourselves do. Our moral faculties are the compass we use in making 
friends, falling in love, staying clear from dangers, sympathy is the pin in that 
very compass by which we naturally are informed by pleasure and self-
approbation and assert to ourselves which way to go. Sympathy, ours and 
others, is what repeatedly assures us of how to share our worlds with each 
other, human moral nature then is very much about bringing people closer 
together and create relationships and to endeavour to become better at it. It 
is not the only faculty of our nature and therefore it often exerts a strong 
force on us in promoting itself. 
 
Although Smith often in his theory makes high convincing arguments, and 
while his theory is highly cohesive, there are some curiosities. Above we have 
touched upon some of these. We address some additional ones now also. As 
it is Smith conveys, what could be called a fairly strict set of statements 
concerning reality, and while this makes his theory in some places strong, it at 
the same time also brings up a lot of begging questions. For instance why is 
self-command to be issued as firmly as he states? It might stem from some of 
the ideals in his time. Alternatively it might also be conveyed as it is, to make 
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the points clear and not vague by bringing in too many complexities. 
However there seems to be much that suggests that many occurrences that 
take place in reality would not fit into Smith’s model. For instance that we are 
in all societies and cultures as apt to make our own view of the world, the 
norms and unwritten rules might be very strong, moreover we might within a 
norm not be able be as inform by our sympathy as we should. Another issue 
when dealing with Smith's way of describing reality is that it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish between the prescriptive and descriptive statements he 
makes. We find this a rather serious issue because, it means that we cannot 
directly deduce his view on how he sees human moral nature, as opposed to 
what things in this he would like to promote. Also Smith seems to leave some 
holes in his theory, for instance by asserting that we are almost always greatly 
prohibited by our irritation to being in the wrong. It could be much doubted, 
the firmness of his statement concerning this, invites openly to it. Again it 
could be to make a point clear, still he could have made a explanation of it, 
not leave it in the dark, because otherwise the reader is not able to relate as 
greatly, to be inspired as greatly, to how he or she should conceive of 
morality in her/his world. The strong adherence to stoicism which Smith has 
also makes it easy to state some apparent questions such as if it is not too 
self-commanding. Smith seems to go against many of our modern norms. 
Which does perhaps not make his statements wrong, but they suggest that his 
theory in some places does not fit with all realities in all times, although may 
inspire many, as it has with us, to wonder and philosophise more about the 
many facets and workings of our morality. The TMS surely is a book which 
opens up to many considerations and illuminations how it is in our moral 
nature to be acquainted with the fact that morality is always more than 
anything something between us, and therefore often strange to us but also 
what we devote ourselves to all the time and therefore should seek to know 
more of, in theory and in practice. 
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